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 ABSTRACT
The United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) protection standard offers a solid basis for 
protecting commercial communication, data, and control facilities. Because of the standard’s shielded barrier and test require-
ments, it is not surprising that there is a strong temptation within industry and government to dismiss the MIL-STD 188-125 ap-
proach in favor of less rigorous protection methods. It is important to understand that US DoD EMP protection standard for fixed 
facilities, MIL-STD-188-125, reflects an evolution by trial and error that spanned a period of decades beginning with the acqui-
sition of the Minuteman Missile System in the 1960s. In fact, one of the main motivating factors for developing the standard was 
that system developers in the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Defense Communications Agency (now Defense Information Systems 
Agency) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency tried less technically-sound approaches that failed in their effective-
ness, testability, and maintainability. This paper revisits the development of the US DoD standard and explains its provisions and 
underlying technical rationale. The paper’s objective is to enable the public officials and engineers involved in planning and imple-
menting EMP protection for critical infrastructure facilities to avoid the pitfalls encountered in the past and use the best practices 
available to achieve low risk protection designs that can be maintained over the entire lifecycle of critical infrastructure systems.
Evolution and Rationale for 
United States Department 
of Defense Electromagnetic 
Pulse Protection Standard
The United States (US) Depart-ment of Defense (DoD) has a long and strong experience base in protecting systems against the 
nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The 
US DoD’s EMP protection experience dates 
back to the 1960s with the development 
of the Minuteman Missile system. In the 
late 1970s, recognizing the non-uniformity 
of EMP protection engineering practices 
across the services and problems with initial 
certification testing and lifecycle monitoring 
and maintenance of EMP protection, efforts 
were begun at the Defense Nuclear Agency 
(DNA) to standardize EMP environment 
criteria and protection engineering re-
quirements. DNA issued the initial contract 
to develop a standard EMP environment 
waveform in 1980 to Vector Research (now 
Metatech, Inc.). This effort was brought to 
fruition by the issuance of DoD-STD-2169. 
In 1986 DNA, in a competitive procure-
ment, selected SRI International to draft a 
protection engineering standard for fixed 
ground-based facilities, culminating in 
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MIL-STD-188-125-1. In 1987, DNA assem-
bled a technical working group to vet the 
standard draft material. The working group 
included expert government and contractor 
representatives from the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and the Defense Communications 
Agency. The working group met at regular 
intervals from 1987 to 1991 to edit and 
approve the final military standard.
A major issue motivating the develop-
ment of MIL-STD-188 was that, with few 
exceptions, the exact nature and seriousness 
of systems malfunctions observed during 
EMP tests were not predicted by pre-test 
analysis. Analysts found that EMP effects 
depend on fine, often trivial, details of 
system construction which are difficult 
to model. Some details such as parasitic 
capacitance and inductance effects and high 
voltage breakdown locations are unknown, 
even when with detailed engineering draw-
ings available, since these details do not 
influence normal system operation. They 
found assessments based on paper studies, 
visual inspection, exact replication of circuit 
schematics, and even low-level testing unre-
liable (US Defense Nuclear Agency 1995).
The assessment of system EMP vulnera-
bility involves detailed analytical compari-
son of the EMP stress levels (fields, current, 
and/or voltage levels) on the system at a 
selected location on the system, with the 
strength (current and/or voltage failure 
thresholds) at the same location. Figure 
1 illustrates the system structural layers 
involved in EMP system response modeling 
and testing. Note that uncertainties in stress 
levels are lowest at the system exterior (cor-
responding to overall system vulnerability) 
and uncertainties in system strength levels 
lowest at the system component level. Any 
one of these layers can serve as the location 
for stress/strength comparisons. Because 
our interest is in overall system vulner-
ability, the ideal location for comparing 
stress with strength would be at the system 
exterior since we can precisely specify 
and impose EMP fields and penetration 
currents here. However, for unprotected 
systems, since large EMP fields and cur-
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Figure 1. System EMP Coupling Layers
rents are allowed to flow through up to 6 
coupling layers from the system exterior to 
internal components of the system (where 
actual failure occurs), it is very difficult to 
predict system strength to a given exterior 
stress. The uncertainty in system exterior 
strength levels magnifies over the system 
lifecycle since internal system components 
are modified or replaced over time.
The difficulty in predicting systems’ 
EMP vulnerability had a major effect on 
the evolution of the DoD EMP protection 
approach. An intense debate occurred with 
the EMP community from the early 1960s 
through the 1980s.  There were two schools 
of thought:
1. The “tailored hardening” advocates 
maintained that protection should 
occur at the box level based on box 
failures observed during system 
testing. This approach placed a heavy 
emphasis on the use of terminal pro-
tection devices. The major attraction 
of the tailored approach was its lower 
up-front costs – systems required no 
initial EMP hardening and only those 
boxes that failed under test required 
protection.  The tailored hardening 
approach was also known as the “test-
fix-test” approach.
2. The “global hardening” advocates 
maintained that protection should 
occur at the system exterior level by 
including an electromagnetic barrier 
as part of the initial system design. 
This approach placed a heavy empha-
sis on external shielding. The major 
attraction of the global approach was 
that the external barrier created an 
electromagnetically “quiet” interior 
such that unhardened commercial 
off-the-shelf boxes could be installed 
inside the system.  The downside 
was higher initial costs associated 
with shielding materials. The global 
hardening approach was also known 
as the “fix-test-fix” approach.
The impasse precipitated two high-level 
reviews. The first review, conducted by a 
special convocation of the Defense Science 
Board (DSB), during 1979-80 focused on 
aircraft protection – “Report of the DSB 
Task Force on EMP Hardening of Aircraft 
(http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/
Special_Collections/11-M-1293.pdf) ” The sec-
ond, conducted by the National Research 
Council of the National Academies of 
Science, during 1982-84 looked at EMP 
protection of systems in general – “Eval-
uation of Methodologies for Estimating 
Vulnerability to Electromagnetic Pulse 
Effects (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/
u2/a144408.pdf) .”
The DSB Task Force Report addressed 
three protection approaches: (1) global 
system shielding, (2) adaptations involving 
protecting only mission-essential equip-
ment, and (3) component hardening. They 
identified two major sources of uncertainty 
underlying their recommendations –un-
certainties in EMP coupling level (stress) 
analysis, and uncertainties in overall system 
failure prediction (strength) analysis. The 
DSB concluded that the tailored protec-
tion approach had an excessive reliance on 
analysis, and the associated uncertainties 
in stress and strength levels did not provide 
high confidence in system survivability. The 
Board recommended that the best approach 
to EMP protection is to use a minimum 
number of contiguous shields with the 
smallest possible number of EMP penetra-
tions (penetrating wires, doors, pipes, and 
apertures). They acknowledged that adap-
tations involving isolating mission critical 
equipment would permit cost-savings by 
reducing necessary shielded volumes.
It is noteworthy that the National Re-
search Council (NRC) committee came to 
the same conclusions as the DSB. Like the 
DSB, the NRC report emphasized the large 
uncertainties inherent in the entire process 
of estimation of currents and voltages at 
the component level and the associated 
protection requirements. Their solution was 
to recommend controlling system stress 
to well-known values by using integral 
shielding and penetration control at the 
system exterior. They also recommended 
great emphasis on developing better and less 
expensive means for virtually complete and 
effective shielding of systems. Their idea was 
to put up a tightly shielded barrier to keep 
the energy out of the system. This creates 
an interior “quiet zone” such that there is 
no need to predict what happens inside 
thus avoiding the associated prediction 
uncertainties. With the proper engineering, 
barrier designs can provide interior field 
and current levels so low that virtually any 
type of electronic component will survive. 
The best way to reduce electronics’ strength 
uncertainties is to provide a system design 
that limits EMP fields and currents at the 
system’s exterior to levels known to be 
generally safe – levels comparable to normal 
signal background noise.
The NRC committee also recommended 
the development of design strategies that 
are testable. A major advantage of global 
shielding is that testing is much easier – 
one must validate only that the outer shield 
is effective. The NRC report stated that 
if the system shield is such that virtually 
nothing gets through, periodic tests of the 
integrity of the shield and high-level cur-
rent injection tests on all cables entering the 
shielded enclosure constitute an adequate 
test. This is important not just for initial 
system acceptance tests, but for lifecycle 
hardness surveillance testing required for 
EMP hardness maintenance. If the outer 
system shield certified effective, interior 
electronics can undergo replacement over 
the system lifecycle without fear of compro-
mising system EMP survivability.
The NRC was critical of the tailored 
hardening approach stating, “The Com-
mittee is uncomfortable with the use of 
tailored hardening to design new systems.” 
They observed that the component-level 
protection rather than the system-lev-
el protection carries much more risk of 
vulnerability, again pointing to inaccuracy 
of analytical EMP coupling and system 
response predictions. It is straightforward 
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to specify or predict EMP levels outside 
a system, but as EMP energy propagates 
inside the system, internal wiring com-
plexity makes it very difficult to predict the 
levels of currents and voltages that flow to 
individual components. The crux of the 
global versus tailored protection issue was 
that this is where the tailored hardening 
proponents were attempting to protect. 
It should be noted that the NRC did not 
entirely dismiss box level protection, but 
observed that protection concepts involving 
shielding at the box level could be admissi-
ble provided that optical fiber was used for 
all box interconnections.
The global shielding approach used by 
DoD beginning in the 1980s follows the 
recommendations of the DSB and NRC 
committees. MIL-STD-188-125-1 embod-
ies the global shielding approach for fixed 
ground-based communication and data 
centers. MIL-STD-188-125-2 embodies the 
global shielding approach for portable and 
ground-mobile systems.
Electromagnetically simple systems with 
a contiguous shield and having a small 
number of protected penetrations engi-
neered by the US DoD can survive EMP. 
The engineering principles are straightfor-
ward as illustrated in Figure 2:
1. Make the electronics portion of the 
system as compact as possible.  
2. Enclose these electronics in a single 
continuous shield.  
3. Limit the number of electromagnetic 
penetrations through the shield and 
protect all remaining penetrations. 
4. Certify the hardness of the system 
via shielding effectiveness tests 
and current injection tests of cable 
penetrations.  
5. Periodically retest the shielding and 
penetration protection integrity to 
maintain hardness over the system 
lifecycle. 
Numerous systems successfully imple-
mented this approach in their engineer-
 Provide a global shield
 Minimize number of 
penetrations
 Protect each penetration:
filters, arrestors
 Provide facility HM/HS
 Implemented extensively
Figure 2. Notional Illustration of the Global Shielding Approach for Fixed Facilities
ing design and fabrication. A partial list 
includes:
Missiles (Minuteman Upgrade, Peace-
keeper, Air Launched Cruise Missile); 
Aircraft (B1-B, TACAMO, E-3A, E-4B); 
and Ground Systems (Ground Launched 
Cruise Missile, MILSTAR, Ground Wave 
Emergency Network, National Military 
Command Center, Alternate National 
Military Command Center, Defense 
Satellite Communication System (DSCS) 
Ground Terminals, Pershing launch 
control system).
An illustration of the MIL-STD-188 
facility outer boundary shield implemented 
on the DSCS ground terminals is included 
in Figure 3.
It is important to note that the US DoD 
standards are test-performance based. 
Engineers can use different shield designs 
and penetration protection devices, as long 
as the shielding effectiveness and pene-
tration currents meet the specified final 
acceptance test.
The justification for EMP protection 
costs for critical infrastructure systems is 
Figure 3. MIL-STD-188-125 Protection Design Example – DSCS Ground Terminal
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clear when compared to the cost of lost 
societal services. For long-term outages 
of the electric power grid caused by EMP, 
economic losses would measure in trillions 
of dollars (Baker 2013). The costs to harden 
are a small fraction of system cost for new 
systems. For example, the US DoD has 
found that EMP protection costs for large 
buildings amount to 3 to 8 percent of total 
system cost if included in the initial system 
design (Gertcher). Costs are manageable 
for retrofit protection of existing systems by 
isolating critical electronics within shielded 
cabinets or rooms.
It is noteworthy that EMP protection has 
many benefits in addition to EMP immuni-
ty. The MIL-STD-188-125 EMP protection 
design enhances signal emanation security 
(TEMPEST protection). In addition, DoD 
standard protection reduces radio frequen-
cy (RF) weapon effects, and is effective 
against solar geomagnetic disturbance 
effects, electric power outages caused by 
line transients, lightning effects, and elec-
tromagnetic interference. 
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